The Political Economy of Progressive Taxation

This volume presents papers which were given at a conference of the Liberty Fund, Washington, co-sponsored by the Carl-Menger Institute, Vienna. The conference took place in Vienna in January 1988. All papers were subject to a refereeing process; some of them had to be revised very extensively. The economics of progressive taxation have been a research topic ever since economists have dealt with the economic role of the state. Old puzzles are the best: the theoretical underpinning of progressivity still is not fully convincing, even after 200 years of economic research. In the present volume we succeeded in publishing some contributions of outstanding economists which present their visions of the topic. Niskanen distinguishes two types of contributions of public choice analysis to understanding and evaluating the tax and transfer system in modern economics: the positive analysis, which examines the issue of how a tax and transfer system would look if it were established by a government subject to majority rule; . and the normative analysis, which tries to discern an optimal system of taxes and transfers. In the normative case the author distinguishes between the "libertarian perspective", in which each person has full rights to any property that he has acquired legally and in which transfers are determined entirely by the preferences of the donors, and the so-called "constitutional perspective" , in which each person elects the rules affecting taxes without knowledge of his position in the post constitutional distribution.